In May 2026, a group of influential German experts, among them René Obermann, Moritz Schularick, Thomas Enders and Jeannette zu Fürstenberg, published a report that aptly captures Berlin's ambitions in the era of Donald Trump's second term and growing scepticism towards the American security umbrella. The document, titled "The Path to European Defence Autonomy", is not an abstract declaration but a precise plan to overcome critical dependencies on the United States across the entire military chain, from the cloud to satellites, precision strikes and air defence.
This sovereignty will cost around 500 billion euros over the course of a decade, of which 150-200 billion by 2030.
American command systems, Starlink satellites, GPS, data-analysis software, sixth-generation fighters and long-range precision-strike capabilities form a network without which no European conflict could be waged. Even after Chancellor Scholz's Zeitenwende and the tripling of the German defence budget to a level of more than 160 billion euros per year by 2029, military orders still go largely to American suppliers. The report's authors propose a radical change: to build significant autonomous capabilities within 3-5 years and, within 5-10 years, to achieve "broad autonomy" in most defence sectors. The key is not money, which in the experts' view is available, but rather political will, the coordination of industry, and breaking with the fragmentation that means Europe gets 30 to 40 percent less combat capability for every euro spent than a centralised player of the US type.
At the heart of the German analysis's plans is the construction of a European command system resilient to disruption, decentralised, based on its own military cloud, artificial intelligence and the integration of data from satellites, drones and ground-based sensors. Germany is to draw on the experience of Ukraine's Delta system as a model, but with sovereign layers of cryptography and classification. In parallel, mass production of autonomous systems is to begin, for example millions of drones, loitering munitions, and unmanned ground and naval vehicles per year. The German automotive and shipbuilding industries, in the authors' view, are capable within a few years of scaling up the production of vessels, especially for the protection of critical infrastructure in the Baltic and North Sea. In the researchers' assessment, it is the German state that will pay for war readiness with taxpayers' money.
Another pillar of self-reliance is long-range strike capabilities. And this means not only sixth-generation fighters (FCAS and its successors), but above all ground-based precision-strike systems-cruise, ballistic and hypersonic-free from American ITAR export controls. The authors stress that Russia possesses the full spectrum of such tools, so Europe must respond with its own arsenal capable of breaking through the adversary's integrated air defence. Anti-aircraft defence is to be built up in layers. From cheap systems for combating drones, through IRIS-T and SAMP/T scaled up to mass production, to advanced lasers and directed-energy systems. Satellites, communications and navigation form a separate chapter, and Germany wants to create a European "Starlink" (an accelerated and simplified IRIS²), its own SAR constellation for reconnaissance, and a PNT system independent of GPS.
Added to this are strategic transport, medical supply in CBRN conditions, and full capability for electronic warfare and SEAD/DEAD-that is, the blinding and destruction of enemy radars and air-defence systems. The whole is to be carried out in the format of a "coalition of the willing" with Germany, France, Poland and the United Kingdom, which together would consume 0.25 percent of EU GDP per year, a sum the report compares to the NextGeneration EU programme after the pandemic, that is, the entire recovery plan.
But the deeper this analysis goes into the details, the more clearly the cracks become apparent.
Germany is energy-dependent on American LNG, technologically dependent on the clouds and software of the big American firms, and commercially dependent on the US market as a key export partner. The attempt at de-risking away from Russia, in their perspective, has simply exchanged one dependency for another. The construction of defence autonomy may paradoxically accelerate the American withdrawal from Europe, which Trump is already signalling. The report is silent on the nuclear dimension-deliberately so, because the topic is politically toxic-but without its own, or a credible Franco-British, nuclear umbrella, conventional autonomy is incomplete.
The plan of May 2026 is not a divorce from Washington, but rather an attempt to renegotiate the marriage. Success depends not on German billions, but on whether Berlin manages to convince its partners and its own society that the era of cheap security under the American umbrella has definitively ended. So far, history shows that the Germans are masters of declarations but weak at carrying them out consistently.
For Poland, the German plans to build "European strategic autonomy" mean both an opportunity for greater investment in Europe's security and a serious political risk. For years, Warsaw has based its security above all on a close alliance with the United States and the presence of US troops on NATO's eastern flank. Meanwhile, part of the German elite is increasingly clearly speaking of the need to reduce dependence on Washington.
From Poland's perspective, the American military presence remains the most important element of deterring Russia. It is the US that possesses NATO's greatest military potential, strategic technologies and the nuclear umbrella. A possible weakening of transatlantic relations could increase security uncertainty in Central and Eastern Europe.
That is why some Polish experts and politicians take a sceptical view of the concept of building European autonomy at the cost of cooperation with the US.
Germany wants to become the main hub of European defence-both militarily and industrially. This would mean greater influence for Berlin over:
In Poland, concerns are emerging that German dominance could lead to the marginalisation of the interests of NATO's eastern-flank states. Especially since Berlin for years pursued a more cautious policy towards Russia and was criticised for its energy dependence on Moscow.
