How to read the map
The map shows the main oil and natural gas pipelines serving Central Europe. Colour indicates commodity and origin, line style - operational status:
- Active oil - TAL + TAL-PLUS, IKL, JANAF, PERN Pomorska, AWP, Transpetrol and Druzhba North (currently carrying KAZAKH crude, not Russian: BY → PL → Schwedt + Leuna)
- Oil - emergency halt - Druzhba South HALTED since 27 January 2026 after the Russian strike on Brody
- Russian gas - active - TurkStream and Balkan Stream (the only remaining route for Russian gas into the EU, 16.8 bcm in 2025)
- Russian gas - reduced / transit ended - Yamal, Druzhba (Brotherhood), OPAL, NEL, EUGAL
- Russian gas - destroyed / banned - Nord Stream 1 (sabotage Sep 2022), Nord Stream 2 (EU sanctions Jul 2025, ban extended by Package 19)
- Norwegian gas / LNG / Azeri - Baltic Pipe, LNG Świnoujście, FSRU 1+2 Gdańsk, LNG Krk, Mukran FSRU, TAP/TANAP
- Intra-European interconnector - PL-SK, GIPL, BRUA, HAG, Vertical Gas Corridor (from Oct 2026)
Markers: square = refinery · blue diamond = LNG terminal · orange star = infrastructure attack 2025-2026 (Unecha, Brody, TurkStream compressor stations)
Crude oil pipelines
Standard unit: Mt/year (million tonnes per year).
| Pipeline | Route | Capacity | Status (Apr 2026) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Druzhba (trunk) | Almetyevsk (Tatarstan) → Samara → Unecha → Mozyr (BY) | ~60 Mt/y | Running, but after the cycle of Ukrainian drone strikes (August 2025) and the Russian attack on Brody (27 Jan 2026) it has been cut repeatedly. On 22-23 February 2026 Ukraine hit the Kaleykino pump station in Tatarstan (retaliation). |
| Druzhba North ✅ | Mozyr → Adamowo (PL) → Płock → Schwedt → Leuna (TotalEnergies) | 27 Mt/y | ACTIVE - carrying KAZAKH crude (not Russian). Russian feedstock halted since February 2023, but the BY→PL→DE infrastructure itself is working: KazMunayGas currently delivers around 130 kt/month to PCK Schwedt and the Leuna refinery (2026 contract). PERN operates the Polish segment as transit. Leak on 29 November 2025 ~70 km west of Płock (sabotage not ruled out). In addition, PL uses Druzhba North for reverse flow from Gdańsk to Schwedt. |
| Druzhba South ⚠️ | Mozyr → Brody (UA) → Uzhhorod → fork: Slovakia (Slovnaft) and Hungary (MOL Duna) | ~20 Mt/y | HALTED since 27 January 2026 after a Russian drone strike on the Brody hub (tank fires burned for 10 days). On 18 February 2026 Slovakia declared its first-ever oil state of emergency, releasing 250 kt from strategic reserves. Zelensky (10 Apr 2026): repairs "this spring". Hungary + Slovakia halted diesel exports to Ukraine. |
| TAL + TAL-PLUS (Transalpine) | Trieste (IT) → Ingolstadt/Karlsruhe (DE) → branches: Schwechat (AT), Kralupy/Litvínov (CZ via IKL) | 43 Mt/y · TAL-PLUS +8 Mt/y for CZ | Fully operational. 25 March 2026 sabotage on Tower 416 of the Tolmezzo-Paluzza 132 kV line (Udine) - two legs of the tower sawed through, the TAL pumping station lost power, the MiRO Karlsruhe refinery had no deliveries for 3 days (until 30 March). Investigation led by DDA Trieste and Italy's ROS. Rosneft Deutschland still holds an 11% stake under German trusteeship - on 5 March 2026 OFAC issued an open-ended sanctions waiver (GL 129A). |
| IKL | Vohburg (DE) → Kralupy nad Vltavou and Litvínov (CZ) | 10 Mt/y (currently up to 8) | Operational - the primary supply route for Czechia since April 2025. Orlen Unipetrol Kralupy refinery: planned outage from 17 March 2026, restart in early May 2026. |
| JANAF / Adria | Omišalj (Krk, HR) → Sisak → Százhalombatta (HU) → Bratislava/Slovnaft (SK) | 34 Mt/y (HR); 14? Mt/y to HU/SK (disputed) | Operational. 11 March 2026 - start of 10-month throughput tests MOL-JANAF with international monitoring. 4 March 2026 MOL + Slovnaft filed a complaint with DG COMP against JANAF for abuse of a dominant position (tariffs of €5/t/100km vs. ~€1 on Druzhba). After the halt of Druzhba South - Croatia is offering Adria as an emergency route for SK/HU. Slovnaft has chartered 7 emergency tankers (SA/NO/KZ/LY). |
| PERN Pomorska + Naftoport | Gdańsk Naftoport → Płock (PL) | 27 Mt/y (two lines) | Operational. Naftoport expansion in progress: DORACO is building station "W" - a second VLCC terminal (+9 Mt/y), target H2 2028, Naftoport's total capacity will rise to 49 Mt/y. |
| AWP (Adria-Wien Pipeline) | Würmlach (AT, TAL spur) → Schwechat refinery | 8-9 Mt/y | Operational. Covers the full demand of the OMV Schwechat refinery. |
| Transpetrol (Slovak Druzhba) | Budkovce (UA border) → Šahy (HU border) + branch to Bratislava and Czechia | 20 Mt/y | Operational. Serves Slovnaft (MOL, 122,000 b/d). MOL Duna/Százhalombatta: 161,000 b/d. Together ~300,000 b/d directly affected by the Druzhba halt. |
Natural gas pipelines
Standard unit: bcm/year (billion cubic metres per year).
Russian corridor
| Pipeline | Route | Capacity | Status (Apr 2026) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yamal-Europe | Torzhok (RU) → Belarus → Kondratki → Włocławek → Mallnow (DE). 4,196 km | 32.9 bcm/y (westbound) | Idle / reversed. Gazprom suspended use of the Polish section in May 2022. EuRoPol Gaz has belonged to Orlen since October 2023. Gaz-System (EUROPOWER November 2025): full "Polonisation" - integration with the Polish system exceeding 40 bcm/y. |
| Nord Stream 1 | Vyborg (RU) → Baltic → Lubmin (DE) | 55 bcm/y | Destroyed 26 September 2022. 19 November 2025 - Italy's Court of Cassation approved the extradition of Serhiy Kuznietsov to Germany (a Polish court refused on 17 Oct 2025). 10 April 2026 - Germany's Federal Court of Justice (BGH) ruled that the sabotage was carried out "with high probability" on behalf of a foreign state, pointing to Ukraine; BGH kept Kuznietsov in custody. |
| Nord Stream 2 | Vyborg → Baltic → Lubmin | 55 bcm/y | Line A severed; Line B physically intact. 19 January 2025: the Danish Energy Agency (DEA) approved a plan to seal Line A. EU sanctions package 18 (18 July 2025) bans its use. Package 19 (23 Oct 2025) extended this. From February 2026 - Trump is considering including NS2 in negotiations with Russia; Lavrov (27 Mar 2026): "The US wants to take over the Nord Streams". Chancellor Merz: "we will do everything to prevent NS2 from being brought back into service". |
| Druzhba (Brotherhood, Rus. Братство; Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhhorod) | Western Siberia → Ukraine → Uzhhorod → Slovakia → Czechia/Austria/Hungary | ~90 bcm/y (design) | Ukrainian transit ended at 00:00 CET on 1 January 2025. Eustream uses the Slovak section in reverse mode (from AT/HU/DE/CZ/PL). |
| TurkStream + Balkan Stream ⚠️ | Russkaya (RU) → Black Sea → Kıyıköy (TR) → Strandzha (BG) → Serbia → Horgoš (HU) | 31.5 bcm/y (offshore, total); 8.5 bcm/y IP Serbia-Hungary | The only remaining route for Russian pipeline gas into the EU. 16.8 bcm actually delivered in 2025 (ABOVE the nominal capacity of the European string). Q1 2026: +11% YoY, March 2026 averaging 55 Mcm/day (+21% YoY). 12 Ukrainian drone strikes on TurkStream/Blue Stream compressor stations (Krasnodar Krai) between February and April 2026: 11 Mar (Russkaya), 19 Mar (Blue Stream), 2 Apr. Gazprom: "operating normally". 5 April 2026 - Serbian services found two backpacks with ~4 kg of plastic explosive, detonators and espionage gear a few hundred metres from the Balkan Stream pipeline near Kanjiža / Velebit (northern Serbia). Vučić informed Orbán; Orbán suggested Ukrainian involvement, Kyiv categorically denied. Magyar/Tisza accused Orbán of fabrication (six days before the election). |
Norwegian corridor and LNG
| Pipeline / Terminal | Route | Capacity | Status (Apr 2026) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Baltic Pipe | Norwegian shelf → Nybro (DK) → Zealand → Niechorze (PL) → Goleniów. 900 km | 10 bcm/y NO→PL · 3 bcm/y reverse | Fully operational since 30 November 2022. Cornerstone of post-Russian gas supply for Poland. |
| LNG Świnoujście | LNG regasification terminal → Polish transmission network | 8.3 bcm/y (since January 2025) | Expansion completed January 2025 (from 5.0 to 8.3 bcm/y). Utilisation >90% - the most heavily loaded LNG port in the EU. |
| FSRU 1 Gdańsk | Floating LNG terminal (Gdańsk Bay) → Polish network | 6.1 bcm/y | Construction in the final phase. Commercial launch planned for late 2027 / early 2028. Full capacity booked by Orlen. |
| FSRU 2 Gdańsk (planned) | Second floating LNG terminal (Gdańsk Bay) → Polish network | 4.5 bcm/y | Gaz-System launched the binding open season in March 2026. With a positive FID - start 1 January 2028. Demand from the 2025 market survey exceeded capacity fourfold. Around half of the regasified LNG is intended for re-export to UA, SK, CZ, LT. |
| Mukran FSRU (Rügen, DE) | Two floating LNG terminals (Neptune + Energos Power) at Mukran → German transmission network | 13.5 bcm/y | Operational since September 2024. 80% of capacity booked for 2026. Replaced Lubmin LNG (Deutsche Ostsee ended commercial operations in April 2024; Lubmin is pivoting to green hydrogen/ammonia). Germany's largest LNG terminal. |
| LNG Krk (HR) | FSRU LNG Croatia → Zlobin → Bosiljevo → Zagreb → Croatian network | 6.1 bcm/y (target end of 2026) | Wärtsilä module expansion completed Q3 2025. Full capacity of 6.1 bcm/y - end of 2026 (Plinacro finishes supporting infrastructure in mid-2026). |
| TAP / TANAP (Southern Gas Corridor) | Shah Deniz II (AZ) → Georgia → Turkey (TANAP) → Greece/Albania/Italy (TAP) | TANAP 16 · TAP 10 bcm/y (+1.2 bcm/y from 2026) | TAP Phase 1 expansion from 2026 (+1.2 bcm/y, 1 bcm for Italy). Phase 2 to 20/32 by 2027. AZ exports to the EU 2025: 12.8 bcm; 2026 forecast: 13-14 bcm. Aliyev (March 2026): "2 new European countries" in 2026. SOCAR-MVM (HU): contract for 800 Mcm over 2 years, start 1 Jan 2026. |
Intra-European transit (interconnectors)
| Pipeline | Route | Capacity | Status (Apr 2026) |
|---|---|---|---|
| OPAL | Lubmin → Brandov (CZ border). 470 km | 36 bcm/y | Physically intact but cut off from its source after NS1 was destroyed. GASCADE cut firm volumes in 2025 to ~10 bcm. Uniper announced in December 2025 the sale of a 20% stake (EU requirement); GASCADE retains 80%. |
| NEL | Lubmin → Rehden (DE) | 20 bcm/y | Intact. Balancing the German network. |
| EUGAL | Lubmin → Deutschneudorf (CZ border), two strings | 55 bcm/y | Intact but empty after NS1/NS2. |
| Gazela | Brandov (DE-CZ) → Rozvadov, 166 km | 30-33 bcm/y | Operational. Reverse flows and domestic Czech supply. |
| TAG (Trans-Austria) | Baumgarten (AT) → Arnoldstein (IT border), 3 strings | 41 bcm/y | Operational. Key for reverse flows IT→AT→CEE. |
| WAG (West-Austria) | Baumgarten ↔ Oberkappel (DE border). Bidirectional | 11 bcm/y (with WAG Loop 1 expansion: +27 TWh/y) | Operational. WAG Loop 1 (+30% westbound) - commissioning end of 2026 / H1 2027, federal funding €70 M (July 2024). |
| HAG (Hungary-Austria) | Baumgarten ↔ Mosonmagyaróvár (HU) | 4.4 bcm/y bidirectional | Operational, currently partially carrying TurkStream molecules from HU to AT. |
| BRUA | Giurgiu → Podișor → Horia (HU border) | Phase 1: 2.63 bcm/y · Phases 2-3: up to 5.32 bcm/y (2029) | Phase 1 operational since June 2023. Brings Azeri SGC gas to CEE. |
| Vertical Gas Corridor | Greece → Bulgaria → Romania → Hungary → Slovakia/Ukraine | Up to 10 bcm/y (northbound) | NEW - commissioning 1 October 2026. Bulgartransgaz has announced the date: IP Kulata/Sidirokastro expansion +50%, Negru Vodă/Kardam +100%. ICGB expansion from 3 to 5 bcm/y. A key new axis, enabling LNG flows from Greece to Ukraine. |
| PL-SK Interconnector | Strachocina (PL) → Veľké Kapušany (SK). 164 km. H2-ready | 5.7 bcm/y PL→SK · 4.7 bcm/y SK→PL | Operational since August 2022. Eustream target: 12.8 bcm/y PL-direction + 10.9 bcm/y SK-direction by 2027. |
| GIPL | Jauniūnai (LT) → Hołowczyce (PL). 508 km | 2.4 bcm/y PL→LT · 1.9 bcm/y LT→PL | Commercial since 1 May 2022. |
| Stork II (CZ-PL interconnector) | Libhošť (CZ) → Kędzierzyn (PL) | 4.6-5.4 bcm/y (planned) | NET4GAS schedule: legally binding application Q4 2026, materials + contractor Q1 2026, land agreements Q2 2027, construction Q4 2027. Realistically: commissioning 2029-2030. |
Latest developments Q4 2025 - Q2 2026
Chronological list of events with a direct impact on the Central European pipeline network. Items marked ⚠️ are events that change the operational status of key infrastructure.
October - December 2025
- 17 October 2025 - A Polish court refused to extradite the Ukrainian Nord Stream 2 sabotage suspect to Germany.
- 23 October 2025 - The EU adopted the 19th sanctions package. Key: ban on short-term imports of Russian LNG from 25 Apr 2026, long-term from 1 Jan 2027. Nord Stream "transaction ban" extended.
- 7 November 2025 - Trump granted Hungary a one-year waiver from US sanctions on Russian oil (Szijjártó: "open-ended").
- 19 November 2025 - Italy's Court of Cassation approved the extradition of Serhiy Kuznietsov (the second Nord Stream suspect) to Germany.
- 29 November 2025 - Leak in the Polish section of Druzhba North ~70 km west of Płock. Sabotage not ruled out, supplies were not interrupted.
- December 2025 - Uniper announced the sale of a 20% stake in OPAL (EU requirement).
- 10 December 2025 - SOCAR-MVM contract: 800 Mcm of Azeri gas for Hungary (~400 Mcm/y), start 1 Jan 2026.
January - February 2026
- 26 January 2026 - The EU Council formally adopted the Regulation on phasing out Russian gas (EU/261/2026, published 2 Feb 2026). Timeline: 25 Apr 2026 short-term LNG, 17 Jun 2026 short-term pipeline, 1 Jan 2027 long-term LNG, 30 Sep 2027 long-term pipeline. Slovakia + Hungary: waiver until 31 Dec 2027.
- 27 January 2026 ⚠️ - A Russian drone struck the LPDS pumping station at Brody (Ukrtransnafta, western Ukraine). Tank fires burned for 10 days. Druzhba South physically halted.
- 12-18 February 2026 - Slovakia publicly confirmed the Druzhba halt. Fico gave a formal speech on 18 Feb.
- 18 February 2026 ⚠️ - Slovakia declared its first-ever oil state of emergency. The government released 250,000 t from strategic reserves for Slovnaft. Hungary and Slovakia halted diesel exports to Ukraine.
- 22-23 February 2026 - Ukraine struck the Kaleykino pumping station in Tatarstan with drones (retaliation).
March 2026
- 4 March 2026 ⚠️ - MOL and Slovnaft filed a formal complaint with the EU's DG COMP against JANAF for abuse of a dominant position in transit tariffs (€5/t/100km vs ~€1 on Druzhba).
- 5 March 2026 ⚠️ - OFAC issued General License 129A - an OPEN-ENDED sanctions waiver for Rosneft Deutschland (and RN Refining & Marketing). It replaced the previous license expiring 30 Apr 2026. Berlin confirmed a "Letter of Comfort" recognising full separation from the parent company.
- 11 March 2026 - Start of a 10-month series of MOL-JANAF throughput tests with international monitoring.
- 11 March 2026 ⚠️ - Ukrainian drone strike on the Russkaya compressor station (TurkStream, Krasnodar Krai).
- 17 March 2026 - Orlen Unipetrol Kralupy: start of planned maintenance outage (investment of >2 billion CZK).
- 19 March 2026 ⚠️ - Second Ukrainian strike on TurkStream/Blue Stream compressor stations. Kremlin: "irresponsible".
- 20 March 2026 - Gaz-System officially launched the binding open season for FSRU 2 Gdańsk (4.5 bcm/y).
- 25 March 2026 ⚠️ - Orbán announced the halt of gas transit to Ukraine from July 2026 in retaliation for the Druzhba dispute. Quote: "Until Ukraine delivers oil, it will not receive gas from Hungary."
- 25 March 2026 ⚠️ - Sabotage of Tower 416 on the Tolmezzo-Paluzza line (132 kV, Udine). Two legs of the tower sawed through. The TAL pumping station lost power - the MiRO Karlsruhe refinery had no deliveries for 3 days (until 30 March). Investigation: DDA Trieste + Carabinieri ROS, with Italian and German services involved. No claim of responsibility.
- 27 March 2026 - Lavrov: "The US wants to take over the Nord Streams". Merz (German Chancellor): "we will do everything to prevent NS2 from being brought back into service".
April 2026
- 2 April 2026 ⚠️ - Third Ukrainian drone strike on TurkStream compressor stations (Gazprom: "renewed strikes").
- 4 April 2026 - Hungary and Slovakia formally asked the ECJ to overturn the EU ban on imports of Russian oil and gas (they challenge the legal basis of REPowerEU).
- 5 April 2026 ⚠️ - Serbian services found ~4 kg of plastic explosive, detonators and espionage gear a few hundred metres from the Balkan Stream pipeline near Kanjiža / Velebit (northern Serbia). Vučić informed Orbán; he convened an extraordinary defence council and visited the site. Orbán suggests Ukrainian involvement, Kyiv denies it. Magyar (opposition, Tisza) publicly accuses Orbán of fabricating the incident - six days before the election.
- 10 April 2026 - Germany's Federal Court of Justice (BGH) ruled that the Nord Stream sabotage was carried out "with high probability" on behalf of a foreign state, pointing to Ukraine. BGH kept Kuznietsov in custody.
- 10 April 2026 - Zelensky (at a conference in Berlin with Merz): Druzhba repair "by the end of April", "not fully, but enough for it to work".
- 11-12 April 2026 - Trump's 30-day general waiver on Russian oil sanctions expired without an official extension (as of 13 Apr). The waiver for Hungary formally remains in force until November 2026.
- 12 April 2026 ⚠️ - Hungarian election: Péter Magyar (Tisza) won with 53.6% of the vote (vs. Fidesz 37.8%), taking a two-thirds majority (138/199 seats). Orbán lost after 16 years.
- 13 April 2026 - Magyar after the election: Hungary will continue buying Russian oil, will NOT join the EU's €90 bn loan for Ukraine, and wants direct talks with Putin on existing energy contracts (including Paks-2). Target for full exit from Russian energy - 2035 (weaker than the EU's 2027).
Oil sanctions status (as of Apr 2026)
| Country | Oil source (2025-2026) | Waiver status |
|---|---|---|
| Germany | Kazakh crude via Druzhba North to PCK Schwedt and Leuna (~130 kt/month) | OFAC GL 129A (5 Mar 2026): open-ended waiver for Rosneft Deutschland. Trusteeship extended to 10 Sep 2026. |
| Poland | Seaborne via Gdańsk → Płock (Orlen) | Completed Feb 2023 - fully diversified. |
| Czechia | TAL-PLUS → IKL (~8 Mt/y, primary route) | Completed April 2025. |
| Slovakia ⚠️ | Druzhba South HALTED since 27 Jan 2026. Oil state of emergency 18 Feb. Strategic reserves + emergency tankers via JANAF. | EU Art. 3m with no end date (de facto moot while Druzhba is down). |
| Hungary ⚠️ | Druzhba South HALTED. MOL is negotiating with JANAF and arranging alternative seaborne supplies. | EU Art. 3m + Trump waiver (November 2025 → November 2026). Elections 12 Apr 2026: Orbán lost to Magyar. Magyar (13 Apr): Hungary continues buying Russian oil, does not join the EU's €90 bn loan for Ukraine, wants direct talks with Putin. Target for full exit 2035 (weaker than the EU's 2027). |
| Austria | TAL → AWP (OMV Schwechat) | No dependence on Russia. |
| Croatia / Slovenia | JANAF → INA Rijeka (seaborne) | No dependence on Russia. |
Sources
ENTSOG-GIE System Capacity Map 2026 · IEA (International Energy Agency) · Bruegel · OSW (Centre for Eastern Studies) · Oxford Institute for Energy Studies · TSO operators: PERN, MERO ČR, TAL Group, JANAF, Transpetrol, Gaz-System, Eustream, FGSZ, Gas Connect Austria, GASCADE, NET4GAS, Bulgartransgaz, Transgaz · News agencies: Reuters, Bloomberg, Al Jazeera, Hydrocarbon Processing, Pipeline & Gas Journal, LNG Prime, LNG Industry, Moscow Times, Kyiv Independent, Kyiv Post, Euronews, CEENERGYNEWS, S&P Global Platts, Kpler
Methodological note: Capacities are design values. Actual flows may be significantly lower. Some parameters (e.g. JANAF deliverable capacity to HU/SK) are actively disputed between operators. Interactive map - use the filters above to show only the categories you are interested in. Country borders: Natural Earth 110m (public domain). Prepared for szyszek.com, as of: 14 April 2026.