How to read the map
The map shows the main oil and natural gas pipelines serving Central Europe. Colour indicates commodity and origin, line style — operational status:
- Active oil — TAL + TAL-PLUS, IKL, JANAF, PERN Pomorska, AWP, Transpetrol and Druzhba North (currently carrying KAZAKH crude, not Russian: BY → PL → Schwedt + Leuna)
- Oil — emergency halt — Druzhba South HALTED since 27 January 2026 after the Russian strike on Brody
- Russian gas — active — TurkStream and Balkan Stream (the only remaining route for Russian gas into the EU, 16.8 bcm in 2025)
- Russian gas — reduced / transit ended — Yamal, Druzhba (Brotherhood), OPAL, NEL, EUGAL
- Russian gas — destroyed / banned — Nord Stream 1 (sabotage Sep 2022), Nord Stream 2 (EU sanctions Jul 2025, ban extended by Package 19)
- Norwegian gas / LNG / Azeri — Baltic Pipe, LNG Świnoujście, FSRU 1+2 Gdańsk, LNG Krk, Mukran FSRU, TAP/TANAP
- Intra-European interconnector — PL-SK, GIPL, BRUA, HAG, Vertical Gas Corridor (from Oct 2026)
Markers: square = refinery · blue diamond = LNG terminal · orange star = infrastructure attack 2025–2026 (Unecha, Brody, TurkStream compressor stations)
Crude oil pipelines
Standard unit: Mt/year (million tonnes per year).
| Pipeline | Route | Capacity | Status (Apr 2026) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Druzhba (trunk) | Almetyevsk (Tatarstan) → Samara → Unecha → Mozyr (BY) | ~60 Mt/y | Running, but after the cycle of Ukrainian drone strikes (August 2025) and the Russian attack on Brody (27 Jan 2026) it has been cut repeatedly. On 22–23 February 2026 Ukraine hit the Kaleykino pump station in Tatarstan (retaliation). |
| Druzhba North ✅ | Mozyr → Adamowo (PL) → Płock → Schwedt → Leuna (TotalEnergies) | 27 Mt/y | ACTIVE — carrying KAZAKH crude (not Russian). Russian feedstock halted since February 2023, but the BY→PL→DE infrastructure itself is working: KazMunayGas currently delivers around 130 kt/month to PCK Schwedt and the Leuna refinery (2026 contract). PERN operates the Polish segment as transit. Leak on 29 November 2025 ~70 km west of Płock (sabotage not ruled out). In addition, PL uses Druzhba North for reverse flow from Gdańsk to Schwedt. |
| Druzhba South ⚠️ | Mozyr → Brody (UA) → Uzhhorod → fork: Slovakia (Slovnaft) and Hungary (MOL Duna) | ~20 Mt/y | HALTED since 27 January 2026 after a Russian drone strike on the Brody hub (tank fires burned for 10 days). On 18 February 2026 Slovakia declared its first-ever oil state of emergency, releasing 250 kt from strategic reserves. Zelensky (10 Apr 2026): repairs "this spring". Hungary + Slovakia halted diesel exports to Ukraine. |
| TAL + TAL-PLUS (Transalpine) | Trieste (IT) → Ingolstadt/Karlsruhe (DE) → branches: Schwechat (AT), Kralupy/Litvínov (CZ via IKL) | 43 Mt/y · TAL-PLUS +8 Mt/y for CZ | Fully operational. 25 March 2026 sabotage on Tower 416 of the Tolmezzo-Paluzza 132 kV line (Udine) — two legs of the tower sawed through, the TAL pumping station lost power, the MiRO Karlsruhe refinery had no deliveries for 3 days (until 30 March). Investigation led by DDA Trieste and Italy's ROS. Rosneft Deutschland still holds an 11% stake under German trusteeship — on 5 March 2026 OFAC issued an open-ended sanctions waiver (GL 129A). |
| IKL | Vohburg (DE) → Kralupy nad Vltavou and Litvínov (CZ) | 10 Mt/y (currently up to 8) | Operational — the primary supply route for Czechia since April 2025. Orlen Unipetrol Kralupy refinery: planned outage from 17 March 2026, restart in early May 2026. |
| JANAF / Adria | Omišalj (Krk, HR) → Sisak → Százhalombatta (HU) → Bratislava/Slovnaft (SK) | 34 Mt/y (HR); 14? Mt/y to HU/SK (disputed) | Operational. 11 March 2026 — start of 10-month throughput tests MOL-JANAF with international monitoring. 4 March 2026 MOL + Slovnaft filed a complaint with DG COMP against JANAF for abuse of a dominant position (tariffs of €5/t/100km vs. ~€1 on Druzhba). After the halt of Druzhba South — Croatia is offering Adria as an emergency route for SK/HU. Slovnaft has chartered 7 emergency tankers (SA/NO/KZ/LY). |
| PERN Pomorska + Naftoport | Gdańsk Naftoport → Płock (PL) | 27 Mt/y (two lines) | Operational. Naftoport expansion in progress: DORACO is building station "W" — a second VLCC terminal (+9 Mt/y), target H2 2028, Naftoport's total capacity will rise to 49 Mt/y. |
| AWP (Adria-Wien Pipeline) | Würmlach (AT, TAL spur) → Schwechat refinery | 8–9 Mt/y | Operational. Covers the full demand of the OMV Schwechat refinery. |
| Transpetrol (Slovak Druzhba) | Budkovce (UA border) → Šahy (HU border) + branch to Bratislava and Czechia | 20 Mt/y | Operational. Serves Slovnaft (MOL, 122,000 b/d). MOL Duna/Százhalombatta: 161,000 b/d. Together ~300,000 b/d directly affected by the Druzhba halt. |
Natural gas pipelines
Standard unit: bcm/year (billion cubic metres per year).
Russian corridor
| Pipeline | Route | Capacity | Status (Apr 2026) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yamal-Europe | Torzhok (RU) → Belarus → Kondratki → Włocławek → Mallnow (DE). 4,196 km | 32.9 bcm/y (westbound) | Idle / reversed. Gazprom suspended use of the Polish section in May 2022. EuRoPol Gaz has belonged to Orlen since October 2023. Gaz-System (EUROPOWER November 2025): full "Polonisation" — integration with the Polish system exceeding 40 bcm/y. |
| Nord Stream 1 | Vyborg (RU) → Baltic → Lubmin (DE) | 55 bcm/y | Destroyed 26 September 2022. 19 November 2025 — Italy's Court of Cassation approved the extradition of Serhiy Kuznietsov to Germany (a Polish court refused on 17 Oct 2025). 10 April 2026 — Germany's Federal Court of Justice (BGH) ruled that the sabotage was carried out "with high probability" on behalf of a foreign state, pointing to Ukraine; BGH kept Kuznietsov in custody. |
| Nord Stream 2 | Vyborg → Baltic → Lubmin | 55 bcm/y | Line A severed; Line B physically intact. 19 January 2025: the Danish Energy Agency (DEA) approved a plan to seal Line A. EU sanctions package 18 (18 July 2025) bans its use. Package 19 (23 Oct 2025) extended this. From February 2026 — Trump is considering including NS2 in negotiations with Russia; Lavrov (27 Mar 2026): "The US wants to take over the Nord Streams". Chancellor Merz: "we will do everything to prevent NS2 from being brought back into service". |
| Druzhba (Brotherhood, Rus. Братство; Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhhorod) | Western Siberia → Ukraine → Uzhhorod → Slovakia → Czechia/Austria/Hungary | ~90 bcm/y (design) | Ukrainian transit ended at 00:00 CET on 1 January 2025. Eustream uses the Slovak section in reverse mode (from AT/HU/DE/CZ/PL). |
| TurkStream + Balkan Stream ⚠️ | Russkaya (RU) → Black Sea → Kıyıköy (TR) → Strandzha (BG) → Serbia → Horgoš (HU) | 31.5 bcm/y (offshore, total); 8.5 bcm/y IP Serbia-Hungary | The only remaining route for Russian pipeline gas into the EU. 16.8 bcm actually delivered in 2025 (ABOVE the nominal capacity of the European string). Q1 2026: +11% YoY, March 2026 averaging 55 Mcm/day (+21% YoY). 12 Ukrainian drone strikes on TurkStream/Blue Stream compressor stations (Krasnodar Krai) between February and April 2026: 11 Mar (Russkaya), 19 Mar (Blue Stream), 2 Apr. Gazprom: "operating normally". 5 April 2026 — Serbian services found two backpacks with ~4 kg of plastic explosive, detonators and espionage gear a few hundred metres from the Balkan Stream pipeline near Kanjiža / Velebit (northern Serbia). Vučić informed Orbán; Orbán suggested Ukrainian involvement, Kyiv categorically denied. Magyar/Tisza accused Orbán of fabrication (six days before the election). |
Norwegian corridor and LNG
| Pipeline / Terminal | Route | Capacity | Status (Apr 2026) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Baltic Pipe | Norwegian shelf → Nybro (DK) → Zealand → Niechorze (PL) → Goleniów. 900 km | 10 bcm/y NO→PL · 3 bcm/y reverse | Fully operational since 30 November 2022. Cornerstone of post-Russian gas supply for Poland. |
| LNG Świnoujście | LNG regasification terminal → Polish transmission network | 8.3 bcm/y (since January 2025) | Expansion completed January 2025 (from 5.0 to 8.3 bcm/y). Utilisation >90% — the most heavily loaded LNG port in the EU. |
| FSRU 1 Gdańsk | Floating LNG terminal (Gdańsk Bay) → Polish network | 6.1 bcm/y | Construction in the final phase. Commercial launch planned for late 2027 / early 2028. Full capacity booked by Orlen. |
| FSRU 2 Gdańsk (planned) | Second floating LNG terminal (Gdańsk Bay) → Polish network | 4.5 bcm/y | Gaz-System launched the binding open season in March 2026. With a positive FID — start 1 January 2028. Demand from the 2025 market survey exceeded capacity fourfold. Around half of the regasified LNG is intended for re-export to UA, SK, CZ, LT. |
| Mukran FSRU (Rügen, DE) | Two floating LNG terminals (Neptune + Energos Power) at Mukran → German transmission network | 13.5 bcm/y | Operational since September 2024. 80% of capacity booked for 2026. Replaced Lubmin LNG (Deutsche Ostsee ended commercial operations in April 2024; Lubmin is pivoting to green hydrogen/ammonia). Germany's largest LNG terminal. |
| LNG Krk (HR) | FSRU LNG Croatia → Zlobin → Bosiljevo → Zagreb → Croatian network | 6.1 bcm/y (target end of 2026) | Wärtsilä module expansion completed Q3 2025. Full capacity of 6.1 bcm/y — end of 2026 (Plinacro finishes supporting infrastructure in mid-2026). |
| TAP / TANAP (Southern Gas Corridor) | Shah Deniz II (AZ) → Georgia → Turkey (TANAP) → Greece/Albania/Italy (TAP) | TANAP 16 · TAP 10 bcm/y (+1.2 bcm/y from 2026) | TAP Phase 1 expansion from 2026 (+1.2 bcm/y, 1 bcm for Italy). Phase 2 to 20/32 by 2027. AZ exports to the EU 2025: 12.8 bcm; 2026 forecast: 13–14 bcm. Aliyev (March 2026): "2 new European countries" in 2026. SOCAR-MVM (HU): contract for 800 Mcm over 2 years, start 1 Jan 2026. |
Intra-European transit (interconnectors)
| Pipeline | Route | Capacity | Status (Apr 2026) |
|---|---|---|---|
| OPAL | Lubmin → Brandov (CZ border). 470 km | 36 bcm/y | Physically intact but cut off from its source after NS1 was destroyed. GASCADE cut firm volumes in 2025 to ~10 bcm. Uniper announced in December 2025 the sale of a 20% stake (EU requirement); GASCADE retains 80%. |
| NEL | Lubmin → Rehden (DE) | 20 bcm/y | Intact. Balancing the German network. |
| EUGAL | Lubmin → Deutschneudorf (CZ border), two strings | 55 bcm/y | Intact but empty after NS1/NS2. |
| Gazela | Brandov (DE-CZ) → Rozvadov, 166 km | 30–33 bcm/y | Operational. Reverse flows and domestic Czech supply. |
| TAG (Trans-Austria) | Baumgarten (AT) → Arnoldstein (IT border), 3 strings | 41 bcm/y | Operational. Key for reverse flows IT→AT→CEE. |
| WAG (West-Austria) | Baumgarten ↔ Oberkappel (DE border). Bidirectional | 11 bcm/y (with WAG Loop 1 expansion: +27 TWh/y) | Operational. WAG Loop 1 (+30% westbound) — commissioning end of 2026 / H1 2027, federal funding €70 M (July 2024). |
| HAG (Hungary-Austria) | Baumgarten ↔ Mosonmagyaróvár (HU) | 4.4 bcm/y bidirectional | Operational, currently partially carrying TurkStream molecules from HU to AT. |
| BRUA | Giurgiu → Podișor → Horia (HU border) | Phase 1: 2.63 bcm/y · Phases 2–3: up to 5.32 bcm/y (2029) | Phase 1 operational since June 2023. Brings Azeri SGC gas to CEE. |
| Vertical Gas Corridor | Greece → Bulgaria → Romania → Hungary → Slovakia/Ukraine | Up to 10 bcm/y (northbound) | NEW — commissioning 1 October 2026. Bulgartransgaz has announced the date: IP Kulata/Sidirokastro expansion +50%, Negru Vodă/Kardam +100%. ICGB expansion from 3 to 5 bcm/y. A key new axis, enabling LNG flows from Greece to Ukraine. |
| PL-SK Interconnector | Strachocina (PL) → Veľké Kapušany (SK). 164 km. H2-ready | 5.7 bcm/y PL→SK · 4.7 bcm/y SK→PL | Operational since August 2022. Eustream target: 12.8 bcm/y PL-direction + 10.9 bcm/y SK-direction by 2027. |
| GIPL | Jauniūnai (LT) → Hołowczyce (PL). 508 km | 2.4 bcm/y PL→LT · 1.9 bcm/y LT→PL | Commercial since 1 May 2022. |
| Stork II (CZ-PL interconnector) | Libhošť (CZ) → Kędzierzyn (PL) | 4.6–5.4 bcm/y (planned) | NET4GAS schedule: legally binding application Q4 2026, materials + contractor Q1 2026, land agreements Q2 2027, construction Q4 2027. Realistically: commissioning 2029–2030. |
Latest developments Q4 2025 – Q2 2026
Chronological list of events with a direct impact on the Central European pipeline network. Items marked ⚠️ are events that change the operational status of key infrastructure.
October – December 2025
- 17 October 2025 — A Polish court refused to extradite the Ukrainian Nord Stream 2 sabotage suspect to Germany.
- 23 October 2025 — The EU adopted the 19th sanctions package. Key: ban on short-term imports of Russian LNG from 25 Apr 2026, long-term from 1 Jan 2027. Nord Stream "transaction ban" extended.
- 7 November 2025 — Trump granted Hungary a one-year waiver from US sanctions on Russian oil (Szijjártó: "open-ended").
- 19 November 2025 — Italy's Court of Cassation approved the extradition of Serhiy Kuznietsov (the second Nord Stream suspect) to Germany.
- 29 November 2025 — Leak in the Polish section of Druzhba North ~70 km west of Płock. Sabotage not ruled out, supplies were not interrupted.
- December 2025 — Uniper announced the sale of a 20% stake in OPAL (EU requirement).
- 10 December 2025 — SOCAR-MVM contract: 800 Mcm of Azeri gas for Hungary (~400 Mcm/y), start 1 Jan 2026.
January – February 2026
- 26 January 2026 — The EU Council formally adopted the Regulation on phasing out Russian gas (EU/261/2026, published 2 Feb 2026). Timeline: 25 Apr 2026 short-term LNG, 17 Jun 2026 short-term pipeline, 1 Jan 2027 long-term LNG, 30 Sep 2027 long-term pipeline. Slovakia + Hungary: waiver until 31 Dec 2027.
- 27 January 2026 ⚠️ — A Russian drone struck the LPDS pumping station at Brody (Ukrtransnafta, western Ukraine). Tank fires burned for 10 days. Druzhba South physically halted.
- 12–18 February 2026 — Slovakia publicly confirmed the Druzhba halt. Fico gave a formal speech on 18 Feb.
- 18 February 2026 ⚠️ — Slovakia declared its first-ever oil state of emergency. The government released 250,000 t from strategic reserves for Slovnaft. Hungary and Slovakia halted diesel exports to Ukraine.
- 22–23 February 2026 — Ukraine struck the Kaleykino pumping station in Tatarstan with drones (retaliation).
March 2026
- 4 March 2026 ⚠️ — MOL and Slovnaft filed a formal complaint with the EU's DG COMP against JANAF for abuse of a dominant position in transit tariffs (€5/t/100km vs ~€1 on Druzhba).
- 5 March 2026 ⚠️ — OFAC issued General License 129A — an OPEN-ENDED sanctions waiver for Rosneft Deutschland (and RN Refining & Marketing). It replaced the previous license expiring 30 Apr 2026. Berlin confirmed a "Letter of Comfort" recognising full separation from the parent company.
- 11 March 2026 — Start of a 10-month series of MOL-JANAF throughput tests with international monitoring.
- 11 March 2026 ⚠️ — Ukrainian drone strike on the Russkaya compressor station (TurkStream, Krasnodar Krai).
- 17 March 2026 — Orlen Unipetrol Kralupy: start of planned maintenance outage (investment of >2 billion CZK).
- 19 March 2026 ⚠️ — Second Ukrainian strike on TurkStream/Blue Stream compressor stations. Kremlin: "irresponsible".
- 20 March 2026 — Gaz-System officially launched the binding open season for FSRU 2 Gdańsk (4.5 bcm/y).
- 25 March 2026 ⚠️ — Orbán announced the halt of gas transit to Ukraine from July 2026 in retaliation for the Druzhba dispute. Quote: "Until Ukraine delivers oil, it will not receive gas from Hungary."
- 25 March 2026 ⚠️ — Sabotage of Tower 416 on the Tolmezzo-Paluzza line (132 kV, Udine). Two legs of the tower sawed through. The TAL pumping station lost power — the MiRO Karlsruhe refinery had no deliveries for 3 days (until 30 March). Investigation: DDA Trieste + Carabinieri ROS, with Italian and German services involved. No claim of responsibility.
- 27 March 2026 — Lavrov: "The US wants to take over the Nord Streams". Merz (German Chancellor): "we will do everything to prevent NS2 from being brought back into service".
April 2026
- 2 April 2026 ⚠️ — Third Ukrainian drone strike on TurkStream compressor stations (Gazprom: "renewed strikes").
- 4 April 2026 — Hungary and Slovakia formally asked the ECJ to overturn the EU ban on imports of Russian oil and gas (they challenge the legal basis of REPowerEU).
- 5 April 2026 ⚠️ — Serbian services found ~4 kg of plastic explosive, detonators and espionage gear a few hundred metres from the Balkan Stream pipeline near Kanjiža / Velebit (northern Serbia). Vučić informed Orbán; he convened an extraordinary defence council and visited the site. Orbán suggests Ukrainian involvement, Kyiv denies it. Magyar (opposition, Tisza) publicly accuses Orbán of fabricating the incident — six days before the election.
- 10 April 2026 — Germany's Federal Court of Justice (BGH) ruled that the Nord Stream sabotage was carried out "with high probability" on behalf of a foreign state, pointing to Ukraine. BGH kept Kuznietsov in custody.
- 10 April 2026 — Zelensky (at a conference in Berlin with Merz): Druzhba repair "by the end of April", "not fully, but enough for it to work".
- 11–12 April 2026 — Trump's 30-day general waiver on Russian oil sanctions expired without an official extension (as of 13 Apr). The waiver for Hungary formally remains in force until November 2026.
- 12 April 2026 ⚠️ — Hungarian election: Péter Magyar (Tisza) won with 53.6% of the vote (vs. Fidesz 37.8%), taking a two-thirds majority (138/199 seats). Orbán lost after 16 years.
- 13 April 2026 — Magyar after the election: Hungary will continue buying Russian oil, will NOT join the EU's €90 bn loan for Ukraine, and wants direct talks with Putin on existing energy contracts (including Paks-2). Target for full exit from Russian energy — 2035 (weaker than the EU's 2027).
Oil sanctions status (as of Apr 2026)
| Country | Oil source (2025–2026) | Waiver status |
|---|---|---|
| Germany | Kazakh crude via Druzhba North to PCK Schwedt and Leuna (~130 kt/month) | OFAC GL 129A (5 Mar 2026): open-ended waiver for Rosneft Deutschland. Trusteeship extended to 10 Sep 2026. |
| Poland | Seaborne via Gdańsk → Płock (Orlen) | Completed Feb 2023 — fully diversified. |
| Czechia | TAL-PLUS → IKL (~8 Mt/y, primary route) | Completed April 2025. |
| Slovakia ⚠️ | Druzhba South HALTED since 27 Jan 2026. Oil state of emergency 18 Feb. Strategic reserves + emergency tankers via JANAF. | EU Art. 3m with no end date (de facto moot while Druzhba is down). |
| Hungary ⚠️ | Druzhba South HALTED. MOL is negotiating with JANAF and arranging alternative seaborne supplies. | EU Art. 3m + Trump waiver (November 2025 → November 2026). Elections 12 Apr 2026: Orbán lost to Magyar. Magyar (13 Apr): Hungary continues buying Russian oil, does not join the EU's €90 bn loan for Ukraine, wants direct talks with Putin. Target for full exit 2035 (weaker than the EU's 2027). |
| Austria | TAL → AWP (OMV Schwechat) | No dependence on Russia. |
| Croatia / Slovenia | JANAF → INA Rijeka (seaborne) | No dependence on Russia. |
Sources
ENTSOG-GIE System Capacity Map 2026 · IEA (International Energy Agency) · Bruegel · OSW (Centre for Eastern Studies) · Oxford Institute for Energy Studies · TSO operators: PERN, MERO ČR, TAL Group, JANAF, Transpetrol, Gaz-System, Eustream, FGSZ, Gas Connect Austria, GASCADE, NET4GAS, Bulgartransgaz, Transgaz · News agencies: Reuters, Bloomberg, Al Jazeera, Hydrocarbon Processing, Pipeline & Gas Journal, LNG Prime, LNG Industry, Moscow Times, Kyiv Independent, Kyiv Post, Euronews, CEENERGYNEWS, S&P Global Platts, Kpler
Methodological note: Capacities are design values. Actual flows may be significantly lower. Some parameters (e.g. JANAF deliverable capacity to HU/SK) are actively disputed between operators. Interactive map — use the filters above to show only the categories you are interested in. Country borders: Natural Earth 110m (public domain). Prepared for szyszek.com, as of: 14 April 2026.