A March 2026 report from the German think tank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) by Susan Stewart shows unequivocally that corruption in Ukraine is only a symptom of a deeper problem, an oligarchic system of governance that has shaped the relationship between politics and business since the 1990s. Despite promising reforms and anti-corruption institutions (NABU, SAPO, WKR), Ukraine still does not fully meet the Copenhagen rule-of-law criteria required for EU membership. SWP is one of the most important German think tanks advising the German government.
The genesis of the oligarchic model goes back to the times of President Leonid Kuchma (1994-2005). At that time, an opaque symbiosis of politics and big business emerged: oligarchs financed and provided media support to political elites in exchange for favorable decisions. This system survived, with some nuances, under Viktor Yushchenko, Viktor Yanukovych, and Petro Poroshenko. Even after the 2013/2014 Revolution of Dignity, which was supposed to be a breakthrough toward democracy and the rule of law, mechanisms of clientelism and "state capture" remained strong. As historian Ricarda Vulpius emphasizes in an interview for the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Putin from the very beginning saw a democratic, rule-of-law Ukraine as an existential threat to his own authoritarian system.
With a democratic, rule-of-law Ukraine at his side, his power would be directly threatened, says Vulpius, pointing to the attempt to poison Yushchenko in 2004 and the murder of Navalny as examples of the Kremlin's reaction to alternative models of governance in its neighborhood.
Volodymyr Zelensky, elected in 2019 as a "man from outside the system," initially seemed to break the pattern. He distanced himself from his former sponsor Ihor Kolomoisky, brought about the arrest of the oligarch and the passage in 2021 of an anti-oligarch law (defining oligarchs by four criteria and imposing restrictions). The war, however, exposed contradictions. In July 2025, parliament tried to weaken key anti-corruption institutions; only mass protests and international pressure forced the changes to be withdrawn. The "Operation Midas" scandal around Energoatom (2025) revealed a system of bribes at the highest levels: the dismissal of ministers and the resignation of the head of the Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak, did not result solely from the fight against corruption, but from calculations of loyalty, popularity, and connections; Yermak's successor became Kyrylo Budanov, the former head of military intelligence with good relations in Trump's circle.
Gert Meissner, in an article for the newspaper "der Freitag" of March 24, 2026, emphasizes that personnel decisions under Zelensky do not at all serve the fight against corruption, but rather the consolidation of presidential power. Parliament is marginalized, and the president ignores its supervisory role. Oligarchs have lost some assets to the war and to nationalization, but the model has not disappeared; rather, it has adapted to the new conditions. The war works in two ways: on the one hand, it increases pressure for reforms (Western aid demands transparency); on the other hand, it generates gigantic financial flows (military, financial, humanitarian aid), introduces restrictions in the name of security, which reduces transparency and facilitates corruption.
According to the report's authors, Ukraine needs not only the strengthening of anti-corruption institutions, but above all a profound transformation of the entire system of power. The key element is to be a wider opening to people from the diaspora and experts from abroad who bring experience of other models of governance and can break pathological dependencies. Equally important is moving away from the model of political parties centered on a single person toward programmatic formations, which requires more effective monitoring of party financing and greater transparency in the work of MPs. Equally important is the reform of legal education - combining legal studies with a strong dimension of ethics and democratic values, so that the new generation of lawyers does not accept the current pathologies. Nor can the role of the media be overlooked. Instead of oligarchic pluralism, independent public and regional media are needed that will be able to conduct a real public debate.
German analysts pin particular hopes on the emergence of a broader coalition for the rule of law. Alongside non-governmental organizations and support from the European Union, small and medium-sized enterprises should, in their view, play an increasingly important role; they lose out on the privileges of the oligarchs and naturally demand equal rules of the game. Such "bottom-up" pressure could reinforce the existing "sandwich" method, that is, simultaneous pressure from civil society and European institutions.
[Author Aleksandra Fedorska is a journalist for Tysol.pl and numerous Polish and German media outlets]
[Title, lead, the "What You Need to Know" and "Why It Matters" sections, as well as some subheadings, were added by the editorial team]
The German think tank's report sheds new light on the real barriers facing Ukraine's integration with the European Union. In the context of EU enlargement plans, it is no longer just a matter of fighting corruption as a single phenomenon, but of a profound rebuilding of the entire state system.
In practice, this means that Ukraine's future in the EU depends not only on the end of the war, but on the ability to permanently break with the oligarchic model of governance and to build credible, resilient state institutions.
Has Ukraine actually made progress in the fight against corruption? Yes, anti-corruption institutions have been created and reforms introduced, but according to the report, they have limited effectiveness against deeper, systemic political-business connections.
What is the problem with the oligarchic system? It consists of strong, informal relationships between political elites and big business that influence state decisions and hinder full transparency in public life.
Is the war with Russia accelerating or slowing down reforms? It works in two directions: it increases Western pressure for change, but at the same time it favors the centralization of power and limits the transparency of decision-making processes.
How does this problem affect Ukraine's chances of joining the EU? Systemic weaknesses in the area of the rule of law may slow the accession process, since the Union requires stable and transparent state institutions.
