Aleksandra Fedorska, an expert on Germany, analyses the latest report by the German think tank Institut für Europäische Politik, which sets out three key conditions for Berlin's assumption of a greater role in European defence policy. In the background are the war in Ukraine, changes within NATO, and the ambitions of the new government of Friedrich Merz.

Berlin must take the lead in order to initiate fundamental systemic changes that go beyond reactive measures - This is the main message of the analysis published in December 2025 by the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP), authored by Dr Pia Fuhrhop and Dr Ronja Kempin.

The war in Ukraine is deepening the divisions between the USA and Europe, in the IEP's view. In the second quarter of 2025, American military aid fell to a mere 0.49 billion euros, while European aid rose to 20.53 billion euros. At the NATO summit in 2025, Berlin and most of the alliance's European members committed to increasing defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2035.

The new German government under the leadership of Chancellor Friedrich Merz declares its ambitions to shape the future of European defence. Merz announced that the Bundeswehr would become "the strongest conventional army in Europe".

To meet the goal it has set itself, the IEP points to three steps that are important for Germany. To fulfil its claim to leadership, the German government must take further steps.

The IEP analysis emphasises that, despite the new ambitions, old constraints are hampering the transformation. Germany, as the EU's largest economy, has a unique opportunity for leadership, but it requires courage in giving up national interests in favour of collective sovereignty. Otherwise, Europe will remain dependent on the USA, and the Russian threat will grow.

Germany wants to fight for leadership in this dimension on several fronts. Through a significant increase in defence spending - in 2025 the Ministry of Defence had a record sum of 86.37 billion euros at its disposal - Berlin is striving to make its armed forces "ready for war". The budgetary reforms and changes to the debt limits from the spring of 2025 make this task easier for them.

At the European level, ties with key partners have been strengthened: a new chapter has been opened in relations with France, a friendship treaty has been signed with the United Kingdom. The Merz government has revived flexible formats such as the E3, the Group of Five or Weimar Plus, where strategic issues are discussed, such as support for Ukraine or joint arms procurement.

Germany has significantly increased its aid to Ukraine. Since the start of the war, it claims, it has delivered weapons worth 40 billion euros. Berlin is also one of the NATO partners that have committed to purchasing military equipment worth 500 billion euros from the USA under the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List mechanism.

Despite Germany's activity, reality and preferences are constraining German ambitions. On the question of the institutional shape of European defence, the rhetoric is lofty, but specifics are lacking. The coalition treaty does, it is true, set out a "comprehensive strategic sovereignty" for Europe, but it does not define the goals or the changes.

Sovereignty is defined chiefly as the ability to procure military equipment for Europe, Ukraine and the countries of the eastern flank. The development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is not a priority; instead, crisis management and intergovernmental formats predominate. In the defence industry, the divergence between aspirations and reality is even more pronounced.

What exactly does the German think tank IEP want? The IEP advocates strengthening Germany's role in European defence through reforms within the EU and NATO, the joint financing of arms procurement, and the integration of the European market for military equipment.

Why does Germany want to assume a greater role in Europe's defence? In the view of the analysis's authors, the war in Ukraine, the diminishing engagement of the USA and the growing threat from Russia require stronger European leadership, which Berlin regards as "its responsibility".

What does this mean for the EU member states? The realisation of the IEP's proposals may lead to a curtailment of national control over defence decisions, particularly in the area of procurement, production and armaments policy.

Does defence integration threaten the sovereignty of EU states? Yes. The transfer of competences to the Union level and the abandonment of treaty exemptions may weaken states' ability to shape their defence policy independently.

Does a stronger defensive Europe mean a diminished role for NATO? Not directly. The IEP assumes a strengthening of the European pillar of NATO; however, in practice greater EU autonomy may shift the balance between alliance structures and national decisions.