On April 20, the European Commission presented a so-called fuel solidarity mechanism, which in essence assumes the redistribution of aviation fuel resources from states possessing surpluses to those struggling with severe shortages. The official justification for introducing these extraordinary contingency plans is the need to secure the continuity of transport in the face of potential destabilizations, such as the persisting impasse in the strategic Strait of Hormuz, which significantly hinders traditional import channels.
However, a deeper analysis of this phenomenon allows us to discern that the proposed model of resource sharing is not merely a technocratic response to a logistical crisis, but an attempt at political management of the consequences of long-standing neglect of the production capacities of Western European refineries.
The main beneficiary of solidarity thus understood is to be Germany, whose aviation fuel sector is based almost half on imports, which in the current geopolitical climate is becoming its Achilles' heel. While Polish refineries have maintained rational production capacities and are able to fully satisfy domestic needs, the German refining system has undergone significant depletion, which is a direct effect of restrictive climate policy and the ideological assumptions of the so-called Green Deal.
German production plants, including eleven key refineries, have reduced their operational capacities by between teens and tens of percent, becoming incapable of flexibly responding to market shocks. In this context, the European Commission's proposal appears as an attempt to rescue states that consciously gave up fuel sovereignty in favor of savings resulting from avoiding ETS emission costs — at the expense of partners who bore the burden of maintaining infrastructure and strategic reserves.
It is significant that the German side, despite the objective possibility of diversifying supplies and taking advantage of export offers from the United States, exhibits strong resistance to changing the existing supplier system. Analysis of the attitudes of decision-makers in Berlin suggests that the reluctance toward American imports stems not only from higher costs, which could lower the competitiveness of German airlines, but above all from a deeply rooted mentality protecting specific economic interests.
Instead of forcing its own entities, such as the PCK refinery, to rapidly expand production potential, Berlin seems to count on free or low-cost support from neighbors, including Poland. Such an approach challenges the definition of equality of partners within the European community, suggesting the existence of a hierarchy in which the countries of Central Europe are to play the role of a fuse for the erroneous strategic decisions of the hegemon.
In the face of such an outlined conflict of interests, Polish energy policy faces the necessity of redefining the concept of solidarity, which cannot be understood as an unconditional tribute to stronger economies. If the fuel-sharing mechanism is to become reality, it must have its market price and take into account the prior prudence of states that did not allow the degradation of their refining industry.
Hitherto cooperation, often based on unwritten agreements and a peculiar geopolitical telepathy, ceases to suffice in the era of real raw-material deficits. Poland, being able to manage its supplies independently, possesses a strong negotiating asset, which should be used to force the partners of the European Union into a more just distribution of the costs of the energy transition and a real strengthening of common logistical security.
