Supporters speak of the need to adapt to the new security reality and effectiveness in the face of the war in Ukraine and hybrid threats from Russia and China. Critics, meanwhile, warn of the creation of a "super-agency" with a license for mass surveillance and sabotage.
For years, Germany has faced the accusation that its intelligence services are "bound hand and foot by law." After scandals of the past (such as the BND's cooperation with the NSA, wiretapping of allies), the Bundestag severely restricted their powers. Today, in 2026, the situation is different. Russia is waging war in Ukraine, China is building up its military, and Donald Trump signals that America may be less willing to share intelligence with Germany.
It is precisely for this reason that the Federal Chancellery (under CDU/CSU and SPD leadership) has drafted a bill that would expand the old law's 69 paragraphs to nearly 140 new ones. The goal is to make the BND independent of foreign partners and to give it the capacity for active operations, rather than merely passive intelligence gathering as before.
The greatest controversy surrounds the very first paragraph of the draft. It reads: "The BND is the civilian and military foreign intelligence service of the Federal Republic of Germany." Until now, the BND was exclusively a civilian service, and military reconnaissance belonged to the Bundeswehr (Militärisches Nachrichtenwesen).
Now the BND is to take over a larger share of operational and tactical military intelligence — from analysis of Russian movements in the Arctic, through Chinese missile capabilities, to North Korean nuclear programs. The service is to receive direct access to Bundeswehr personnel, equipment, and data: satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, cyber units, and even special forces soldiers. The Ministry of Defense (BMVg) is furious. It fears losing key competencies and resources to a service answerable solely to the Federal Chancellery. In the event of a crisis or war, the BND would not be integrated into the Bundeswehr's chain of command.
Opponents of the new law — from NGOs to left-leaning media — speak plainly of the "militarization of intelligence" and a return to Cold War times. The IMI (Informationsstelle Militarisierung) website emphasizes that the new competencies are a further step toward a "police state" and the militarization of the entire security apparatus. According to critics, the bill was drafted in an atmosphere of fear of Russia, but will in reality strike at the civil liberties of Germans and Europeans. Particularly alarming is the expansion of internet surveillance — something the European Court of Human Rights already found problematic in the previous version of the BND law. Reporters Without Borders and the Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte (GFF) have also filed complaints, arguing that the new provisions threaten the protection of journalistic sources and press freedom. In the Bundestag, the opposition (Left Party, Greens) has announced firm resistance as well. They fear that under the pretext of "new threats," a service will be created that practically no one will be able to effectively oversee.
A completely different narrative is presented by "Die Welt." An article titled "Do Germans Trust Their Intelligence Services Too Little?" quotes military historian Sönke Neitzel, who believes Germans still have a complex about their past and treat their own services as a potential threat rather than a tool of defense. According to supporters of the reform, the current restrictions are "hypocrisy" — Germany benefits from American, British, and French data but does not want to take on responsibility itself. "At a time when war is being waged on our borders and hybrid attacks are an everyday occurrence, we cannot afford intelligence services that merely collect information and write reports," write commentators in media close to the government.
The bill is still at the inter-ministerial consultation stage. The Chancellery wants to introduce it in the Bundestag in the first half of 2026. Everything indicates, however, that the road ahead will be bumpy — the dispute with the Ministry of Defense, resistance from left-wing parties, and pressure from NGOs could significantly delay or dilute the most controversial provisions.
[The author, Aleksandra Fedorska, is a journalist for Tysol.pl and numerous Polish and German media outlets]
[Title, "What You Need to Know," "What This Means for Poland" sections and FAQ by the Editorial Team]
Greater operational capabilities for the BND mean greater activity in the region. If the reform takes effect, the Bundesnachrichtendienst will gain broader operational and military competencies. Poland — as a NATO frontline state, a logistics hub for Ukraine support, and a country bordering Russia (Kaliningrad exclave) — lies within the BND's natural area of interest.
The risk of expanded cross-border surveillance. The expansion of competencies in cyber intelligence and data analysis could mean greater capabilities for gathering information from the digital space encompassing Poland as well.
Impact on intelligence cooperation within NATO and the EU. A stronger BND could mean a larger role for Germany in NATO and EU intelligence structures. For Poland, this is simultaneously an opportunity for deeper cooperation and a challenge — the need to safeguard its own information interests and protect strategic data.
The political and historical dimension. In Poland, the topic of German intelligence services evokes particular historical sensitivity. Any strengthening of operational capabilities on Berlin's side could become an element of domestic political debate — especially in the context of sovereignty and information security.
