A report by the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) from December 2025, titled "Anatomie der Anti-Zeitenwende: Konturen einer AfD-Außenpolitik," by Jacob Ross, sheds new light on the foreign policy of the Alternative for Germany (AfD).

The 60-page document focuses on the ideological foundations of a party that is increasingly boldly challenging the liberal international order. Although the AfD is often viewed through the lens of domestic politics, the report highlights its vision of a multipolar world in which national interests take precedence over universal values. In the Polish context, the AfD positions itself as an ally of national sovereignty, criticizing the European Union and seeing in Warsaw a potential partner in a "Europe of homelands."

The AfD, as the analysis shows, rejects the current German foreign policy promoted by chancellors Olaf Scholz and Friedrich Merz. Instead, the party advocates "interests instead of values" — a slogan that resonates with the majority of Global South nations. The report points to inspirations from post-liberalism, drawing on thinkers such as Alain de Benoist and Antonio Gramsci in a specifically right-wing interpretation.

In a multipolar world, the AfD distances itself from the "collective West," preferring a "Europe of nations." The party increasingly rarely questions EU membership but demands its radical reform: less integration, more sovereignty. This opens the door to alliances with right-wing parties in Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland.

The report directly references Poland in the context of rule-of-law disputes. AfD politicians such as Maximilian Krah sharply criticize the EU for interfering in the internal affairs of Warsaw and Budapest. In the dispute over the primacy of EU law, the AfD sides with Poland and Hungary, arguing that the EU is exceeding its competencies. In 2023, Krah demanded the replacement of the current Union with a "union of European nations" — a formula borrowed from Charles de Gaulle. Benedikt Kaiser, an AfD ideologue, goes further. The report cites his scenario of a "conservative revolution" in Central and Eastern Europe. The eastern German states (such as Saxony and Thuringia) would in this process become the vanguard alongside the Visegrád Group countries: Poland, Slovakia, Czechia, and Hungary. The AfD watches with satisfaction the good relations between Viktor Orbán's Hungary and the Trump administration, building its own contacts in the region — especially in Budapest, where the CDU/CSU is losing influence due to the "Brandmauer" (the firewall separating it from the far right).

The report also mentions the broader context: attacks on democracy in Poland and Romania are for the AfD an example of how the liberal establishment suppresses political alternatives. The party sees in this a parallel to its own experiences with the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

The AfD is a traditionally pro-Russian party, and especially in eastern Germany it benefits from "tactical transatlanticism." The report describes how the AfD exploits MAGA (Make America Great Again) sympathy for Orbán to position itself as the genuine bridge between the US and Central Europe. Poland, as a key NATO ally, could benefit from this dynamic, but the AfD challenges the "universalism" of the West, which undermines solidarity with Ukraine — a sensitive topic for Warsaw. An internal conflict within the AfD over its stance toward the US could affect relations with Poland.

It must also be remembered that an important element of AfD policy toward Poland is opposition to reparations demands and historical revisionism.

Does the AfD view Poland as an ally? Yes — the AfD sees Poland as a potential partner in its project of a "Europe of nations," based on state sovereignty and the limitation of EU institutional competencies.

How does the AfD relate to Poland's disputes with the EU over the rule of law? The party consistently criticizes the European Commission's and CJEU's interference in the internal affairs of member states, siding with Warsaw and Budapest.

Would a potential AfD government improve Polish-German relations? Partially, perhaps. There is convergence on sovereignty and EU criticism, but serious differences remain on security, Russia, and Ukraine.

How does the AfD approach the issue of war reparations for Poland? The AfD opposes reparations demands and adopts a revisionist stance on historical policy, which constitutes a significant barrier in relations with Poland.

Can the AfD realistically influence Germany's policy toward Poland? For now, mainly indirectly — through pressure on public debate and growing support in parts of Germany. Real influence would depend on the AfD entering the federal government or a lasting shift in the balance of power in the Bundestag.