This year Germany is grappling with a serious gas crisis. Underground storage levels have fallen to a historic low — roughly 23.5–24 percent, with data from AGSI/GIE and the Bundesnetzagentur showing 23.54 percent as of February 17, 2026. That is well below the legally mandated minimum of 30 percent as of February 1 and far under the average for previous years (approximately 50–58 percent in mid-February). Compared with February 2025 (about 55–58 percent) and 2024 (76 percent), the situation is alarming — the worst since 2018.
The main reasons for the record-low storage levels in February 2026 are, first and foremost, an exceptionally long and bitter January. Temperatures significantly below the long-term average triggered a sharp spike in consumption — daily withdrawals reached 1.2–1.7 TWh, and even more on the coldest days. The second key factor is the complete absence of Russian pipeline gas since 2022. Gazprom first drastically curtailed and then effectively halted transit, forcing Germany and all of Europe to radically restructure imports toward more expensive and less flexible LNG.
The third cause is the failure to fill storage facilities during the summer of 2025. Despite high LNG prices and EU regulations requiring a minimum 90 percent fill level before the heating season, that target was not met — storage entered the winter with a deficit of 15–20 percentage points. On top of this, there are the physical limitations of the storage sites themselves: when levels drop below 25–20 percent, pressure in porous reservoirs falls so sharply that the maximum gas withdrawal rate can decrease by 50–70 percent. This poses a real threat to grid stability if the cold spell extends into March.
Across the European Union as a whole, the average fill level currently stands at approximately 34 percent (388 TWh), which is also below the seasonal norm. Germany, which operates the largest storage facilities on the continent (capacity of roughly 251 TWh), accounts for a significant share of this European deficit and bears the heaviest consequences of the current situation.
Bavaria is particularly vulnerable. Four key storage sites (Bierwang, Breitbrunn, Inzenham-West, Wolfersberg) are supposed to be at 40 percent by February 1 — in reality, many of them were below 25 percent, and the largest, Rehden, held just around 11 percent (data from late January/early February 2026). The Bundesnetzagentur reports that Bavaria's average level is about 18–20 percent in mid-February — one of the lowest figures in the country. Proximity to Austria helps, but local industry (chemicals, automotive, breweries, among others) and dense residential development heighten the risk. Experts warn that a further drop below 15–20 percent could mean problems with peak-demand supply, even if the overall volume of gas is sufficient.
Europe has increased LNG imports by roughly 44 percent above the five-year average of 252,000 tons per day. The main sources are the United States (19.4 billion cubic feet per day), Qatar, and Australia. Yet there has been a curious twist: China, the world's largest LNG importer, has indirectly become an exporter to Europe. Owing to a sluggish economy, weak industrial demand, and alternative sources (coal, renewables), Chinese traders are reselling surpluses.
A case in point is the tanker "Seapeak Glasgow," which in late January 2026 loaded gas of U.S., Australian, and Qatari origin at Ningbo (China) and is sailing to Europe — expected to arrive around March 12. It is the first such east-to-west route in four years. The price arbitrage allows Chinese firms to profit, but it raises costs for Europeans.
The German government and the Bundesnetzagentur are offering reassurances: supplies are secure thanks to Norway (approximately 44 percent of imports in 2025), the Netherlands, Belgium, and LNG terminals (Wilhelmshaven, Brunsbuttel, Stade).
